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pAbstract
I assess the short-term impact of a public employment program on child labor and
school attendance in Argentina. Public employment increases opportunities for
adults outside the household, and may correspondingly raise the returns to children’s
productive activities at home. The effect of public employment on school attendance
may thus be small. However, I find that the program substantially increased children’s
school attendance in addition to reducing child labor. My empirical strategy exploits
an arbitrary enrollment cutoff date to compare program beneficiaries with a
propensity-matched group of applicants not receiving benefits.
Keywords: Child labor; Public employment; Social protection; Argentina
JEL classification: J22; J13; J68; 0151 Introduction
The severe economic crisis that hit Argentina at the end of 2001 resulted in a doubling of
poverty and extreme poverty. In response, the government implemented a public employ-
ment scheme called Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados (Jefas). The main purpose of Jefas
was to alleviate suffering by providing cash to poor families with children. By bolstering
household income, program designers hoped to improve children’s well-being.
The existence of a relationship between household income and children’s work and
school attendance has been well-established, both theoretically (Basu and Van 1998)
and empirically (e.g. Fiszbein and Schady 2009). Indeed, a large literature demonstrates
that pure and conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) reduce child labor and in-
crease school attendance (Schultz 2004; Attanasio et al. 2006; Filmer and Schady 2008;
Edmonds and Schady 2009).
However, a key difference between public employment and cash transfers is that by
requiring parents to increase their work hours outside of the home, public employ-
ment may raise the returns to children’s productive activities in the household and thus
increase the opportunity cost of school attendance. The Jefas program required partici-
pants to work 20 hours per week in order to receive benefits. In contrast, CCTs have
been shown to modestly reduce participants’ hours of paid work (Fernandez and
Saldarriaga 2014). As a result, the impact on children’s school attendance may be
smaller for public employment than for CCTs.Juras; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly credited.
2014
Juras IZA Journal of Labor & Development Page 2 of 202014, 3:14
http://www.izajold.com/content/3/1/14In this paper, I estimate the impact of Jefas on child work and school attendance for chil-
dren ages 10–14 by comparing Jefas participants with a propensity-matched group of pro-
gram applicants who were not receiving benefits. The same basic strategy was used by
Galasso and Ravallion (2004) to estimate the effect of Jefas participation on adult employ-
ment, incomes, and poverty as well as to study program targeting and distributional impacts.
Galasso and Ravallion (2004) found that Jefas had only a small effect on the overall
poverty rate but a larger effect on the extreme poverty rate. They also found that the
program’s work requirement was largely binding and that targeting was good, with
about half of Jefas participants coming from the poorest fifth of Argentine families.
However, a large share of program participants were women who would not otherwise
have been in the labor force. For that reason, the program was only able to reduce the
unemployment rate by 2.5%, rather than the 5% reduction that would have occurred
had all participants been otherwise unemployed.
Building on Galasso and Ravallion’s (2004) empirical strategy, I find that the Jefas
program was beneficial for children’s work and school attendance. Using cross-
sectional data, I find that children age 10–14 whose parents enrolled in the Jefas
program and received benefits were 46% (0.6 percentage points) less likely to report
working and 38% (2.0 percentage points) less likely to forgo schooling, compared with
similar children whose parents had applied but were not enrolled. Matched difference-
in-differences estimates using a smaller panel sample confirm these results, suggesting
program effects of 0.8 percentage points on child work and 1.8 percentage points on
school attendance. These findings demonstrate that public employment can be effective
at both reducing child work and increasing school attendance.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. I describe the background and in-
stitutional details of the Jefas program in section 2. In Section 3 I describe the data, and in
Section 4 I present descriptive statistics of the sample used for analysis. I outline the em-
pirical methodology in Section 5, and present the main results in Section 6. Additional
analyses and sensitivity checks are presented in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.2 Background on the economic crisis and the Jefas program
A severe economic crisis hit Argentina at the end of 2001, brought about by default on
external debt and a sharp devaluation in the Argentine peso. As a result, many workers
saw substantial declines in their real incomes and the country overall experienced a
doubling of poverty and extreme poverty. Households without savings had difficulty
adjusting to the downturn, as most affected workers were unable to mitigate the effect
of the crisis by increasing their work hours (McKenzie 2004).
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some families attempted to cope with the crisis by
sending individuals other than the primary worker—including children—into the work-
force to compensate for the decline in real wage income. Indeed, while estimates of child
work in Argentina vary considerably, news sources at the time of the crisis reported an in-
crease in child work (Palacios 2003) and corresponding decline in school attendance
(Hennigan 2003). Likewise, according to the Bureau of International Affairs (2009),
UNICEF reported a 600% increase in child work between 1995 and 2003, with 40% of
those children who worked abandoning school, and ILO-IPEC (2002) reported an increase
in child work between 1997 and 2002 which it attributed to the economic crisis.
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financed public employment program called Programa Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupa-
dos (“Unemployed Male and Female Heads of Household Program”), or Jefas. The main
purpose of Jefas was to alleviate suffering by providing cash to poor families with chil-
dren. A secondary purpose was to lower the official unemployment rate by providing
work opportunities to the unemployed.
Public employment schemes are an increasingly popular method of transferring in-
come to poor households in developing countries. Safety-net programs of this type can
be relatively easy to roll out and, if well designed, allow beneficiaries to self-select into
the program (Ravallion 1990; Besley and Coate 1992). Participants in Jefas were re-
quired to engage in an eligible work or job-training activity no less than 4 hours per
day, 5 days per week.
The total number of work opportunities was initially limited, so participants were en-
rolled into the program on a first-come, first-serve basis as opportunities became avail-
able. Participants received a monthly wage of AR$150 (about US$50). This amount was
set to be below the expected full-time wage rate for households in the bottom decile of
the earnings distribution so as not to attract individuals who were already employed1.
Program eligibility was limited to one adult per household. Because the program was
intended for parents, applicants also had to prove that children under the age of 18 or
a disabled adult were present in the household. These requirements were strictly
enforced. Several additional formal eligibility requirements for individual applicants,
including unemployment and status as the head of household, were not enforced
(Galasso and Ravallion, 2004).
Jefas began accepting applications in Spring 2002 and the program experienced rapid
growth, increasing in size from 574,000 participants in May 2002 to 1,857,000 in
December 2002, with aid reaching an estimated 10 million family members in partici-
pating households. The ultimate size of the applicant pool exceeded what both the
World Bank and the government had expected based on estimates of the target popula-
tion (World Bank 2006). This resulted in serious budgetary pressures even though most
other safety net programs were eliminated or reduced in order to shift funding to Jefas. As
a result, registration was abruptly closed in September 2002 with only 65% of applicants
having been enrolled (i.e. assigned to participate in work opportunities). Applicants were
not given prior notice of the September 2002 deadline and most applicants remaining on
the waiting list at that time were subsequently unable to enroll in the program2.3 Data
This analysis uses data from the October 2001 and October 2002 rounds of the Encuesta
Permanente de Hogares (EPH). The EPH survey is administered twice per year, in May
and October, by the National Institute for Census and Statistics (INDEC). The EPH pro-
vides a representative sample in 31 large urban areas that together represent approxi-
mately 70% of Argentina’s urban population and 60% of its total population.
The EPH was modeled after—and as a result is similar to—the Current Population
Survey in the United States. The sample consists of residences (households) for which
interviews are conducted in-person. Data are recorded separately for each occupant
(including children). Because the primary purpose of the EPH is the systematic
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of respondents when scheduling interviews. Interviewers have a one-week window dur-
ing which to conduct interviews for any given residence. Responses are kept strictly
anonymous.
The EPH includes a short-duration longitudinal component. Each household is con-
tacted during four consecutive survey waves, with one-quarter of households rotated
out of the sample in each wave and replaced with newly-selected households. Approxi-
mately one-half of residences can thus be linked as a panel between the October 2001
and October 2002 survey waves.
The October 2002 survey round was conducted after enrollment in Jefas had ended. I
use data from Oct. 2002 to select the primary analysis sample and to measure post-
program outcomes. The Oct. 2001 survey round was completed prior to the onset of
the economic and political crisis in November-December 2001 and well prior to the
subsequent initiation of the Jefas program in Spring 2002. I therefore use the Oct. 2001
survey round to measure pre-intervention baseline characteristics for the sample of
households interviewed in both survey waves.
In this study I estimate impacts by comparing the outcomes for children in partici-
pant households (i.e. households that had enrolled in the Jefas program and were re-
ceiving benefits in Oct. 2002) with the outcomes of children in a propensity-matched
group of applicant households (i.e. households that had applied to the program but
were still on the waiting list at the time of the October 2002 survey). This strategy was
previously used by Galasso and Ravallion (2004) to estimate the impact of the Jefas
program on adult labor market outcomes. As they argue, applicants’ demonstrated
preference for program participation makes them an appealing comparison group. Fur-
thermore, the rapid scale-up of the program and large size of the waiting list imply that
selection of participants may have been somewhat random. I will return to a discussion
of the estimation strategy in Section 5.
Jefas participants and applicants are identified in the EPH using the October 2002
survey, which included a special module on Jefas participation. This module was de-
signed for program evaluation and was administered to both participants and appli-
cants not yet receiving benefits3. The 2002 survey data used in this paper include
observations on 1,136 households with a Jefas participant and 399 households with a
Jefas applicant. Galasso and Ravallion (2004) found that the EPH slightly under-reports
participation in Jefas, but concluded that the discrepancy “is not large enough to war-
rant serious concern about sampling bias in the EPH”.
I construct a panel sample of participants and applicants by merging the Oct. 2002
and Oct. 2001 EPH samples. Because the EPH is a sample of residences and not indi-
viduals, it is likely that some residences have different occupants across the two years.
To ensure the highest proportion of “valid” merges between 2001 and 2002 (i.e. house-
holds with the same occupants in both years), I follow the recommendation of Madrian
and Lefgren (2000) for CPS data and exclude certain suspect observations. Specifically,
I exclude individuals whose gender differs between 2001 and 2002 or whose age
changes by less than −1 or more than 3 years4. All told, 4.9% of the participant sample
and 3.6% of the applicant sample were excluded for this reason. This process creates
the possibility of bias due to sample attrition, which is a limitation of the longitudinal
analysis. However, any such bias is likely to be small due to the small number of
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ticipant and 164 households with an applicant.
Work and school attendance outcomes are measured using the Oct. 2002 survey. I
assess these outcomes for children ages 10–14 only. This age range was chosen to be
representative of children who are on the margin of work and school attendance; i.e.
most vulnerable to pressures to skip school and/or begin working in dire economic cir-
cumstances despite formal prohibitions. This decision was driven by institutional
knowledge and empirical evidence.
Work for pay appears to be very rare for children under the age of 10 in Argentina,
perhaps due to stigma. In the data used for this analysis, the reported prevalence of
work is approximately zero for children under age 10. In contrast, work for pay is legal
under some circumstances for children older than 14, who are allowed by law to work
up to 6 hours per day if granted special permission from administrative authorities
(Bureau of International Affairs 2009).
Argentina’s public education system is free and compulsory for children between the
ages of 5 and 15 (Bureau of International Affairs 2009). In the EPH data, the reported
rate of school attendance is greater than 98% for children under the age of 10 but be-
gins to fall after that age. According to Argentina’s Census and Statistics Institute
(INDEC, 2001), more than 79% of children who enrolled in primary school in
Argentina complete primary education through grade 9 (usually age 14).
For children ages 10–14, I code “works” as a binary variable equal to 1 if the child is
reported as working for pay at any point during the survey reference week, and I code
“attends school” as a binary variable equal to 1 if the child is reported as attending
school during the reference week. Analyses in this paper are generally performed at the
household level, with child-level outcomes aggregated within households as “percent of
children working” and “percent of children attending school”.4 Sample descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents baseline (pre-program) descriptive statistics, including the outcomes
of interest, for the sample of 668 households (984 children) in the 2001–2002 panel
dataset. Table 1 presents estimates separately by the household’s application status. In
all descriptive tables, household-level observations are weighted by number of children.
Therefore, the reported estimates represent child-level means with standard errors
clustered by household.
The observable attributes presented in Table 1 are well-balanced between participants
and applicants. Table 1 suggests statistically significant evidence of baseline imbalance for
only 1 out of the 11 observable baseline characteristics (and neither of the outcomes of
interest) at p < 0.105. However, the one characteristic that exhibits a statistically significant
difference, rooms per person, is a particularly problematic one. This characteristic is
sometimes used as a proxy for household wealth, and the difference is in the direction that
would be expected if the neediest households were first to apply (i.e. participants, who ap-
plied first, are less wealthy than applicants). Therefore, the possibility the participants and
applicants differ on important unobservable characteristics should not be ruled out.
With respect to published estimates of child work in Argentina’s urban areas, it also
appears that child work may be slightly underreported in the EPH. For example, in
Table 1 Baseline (2001) descriptive statistics for panel dataset
Participants Applicants Difference
(part. - appl.)
Mean St.err. Mean St.err. Value T-stat
Outcomes of interest (2001)
Child works 0.011 (0.004) 0.008 (0.007) −0.002 [0.29]
Child attends school 0.985 (0.005) 0.983 (0.010) 0.002 [0.20]
Attributes of children (2001)
Male 0.514 (0.018) 0.500 (0.034) 0.016 [0.43]
Age 10.86 (0.490) 10.90 (0.840) −0.034 [0.34]
Attributes of the household (2001)
Located in a shantytown 0.051 (0.010) 0.063 (0.019) −0.012 [0.58]
Bathroom 0.885 (0.014) 0.908 (0.023) −0.023 [0.83]
Rooms per person 0.435 (0.012) 0.501 (0.022) −0.066 [2.77]***
Number of children <18 in hhld 4.212 (0.098) 4.000 (0.181) 0.216 [1.07]
Single household head 0.082 (0.017) 0.079 (0.029) 0.003 [0.05]
Married household head 0.447 (0.014) 0.487 (0.025) −0.040 [1.37]
Household size 7.093 (0.134) 6.766 (0.206) 0.327 [1.24]
Number of observations 504 164
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%; Standard errors are in parentheses, and t-statistics are in brackets.
Sample is households with children age 10–14 in which at least one adult has applied to Jefas. Data from Oct. 2001 EPH.
All estimates are weighted by household size. Bolded text is used to signify impact estimates for primary outcomes.
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(including in rural areas) and the ILO estimated that 2.2% of children ages 10–14 in urban
areas were working (World Bank, 2003). In contrast, the incidence of child work reported
in Table 1 is 1.1%. There is no evidence to suggest that under-reporting would have affected
the treatment and comparison groups differentially, although this is impossible to verify6.
Table 2 shows post-program descriptive statistics for the 2,307 children in 1,535
households in the 2002 cross-section. Again, estimates are presented for demographic
characteristics as well as the outcomes of interest, and separately by application status.
The unadjusted means in Table 2 suggest that the program may have had an impact on
children’s work and schooling: in 2002, the children of participants were less than half as
likely to work as the children of applicants, and somewhat more likely to attend school.
The unadjusted difference in means is statistically significant for work (p = 0.047) but not
for school attendance (p = 0.101). If participants and applicants had been randomly
assigned, the cross-sectional difference in means would serve as an unbiased estimate of
program impacts: a 1.1 percentage point decline in child labor and a 1.5 percentage point
increase in school attendance.
However, Table 2 also shows some evidence of imbalance between the treatment and
comparison groups on household characteristics that are presumably immutable, such
as the gender of the applicant. Although the evidence for pre-existing differences is
slight, these imbalances suggest that the naïve impact estimate suggested by Table 2
should be viewed with caution.
Finally, Table 3 shows how selected observable characteristics changed between 2001
and 2002 for the panel sample of 984 children, again separately by application status of
the parent.
Table 2 Post-program descriptive statistics
Participants Applicants Difference
(part. - appl.)
Mean St.err. Mean St.err. Value T-stat
Outcomes of interest
Child works 0.009 (0.002) 0.020 (0.006) −0.011 [1.99]**
Child attends school 0.967 (0.004) 0.952 (0.009) 0.015 [1.64]
Attributes of children
Male 0.511 (0.012) 0.517 (0.021) −0.007 [0.29]
Age 11.889 (0.031) 11.935 (0.053) −0.046 [0.76]
Attributes of applicants
Applicant age 37.07 (0.237) 36.72 (0.479) 0.352 [0.73]
Applicant is male 0.315 (0.014) 0.393 (0.024) −0.077 [2.82]***
Applicant is household head 0.481 (0.015) 0.466 (0.025) 0.015 [0.53]
Attributes of the household
Lives in a shantytown 0.059 (0.007) 0.065 (0.014) −0.006 [0.45]
Bathroom 0.902 (0.009) 0.874 (0.017) 0.029 [1.60]
Rooms per person 0.435 (0.007) 0.457 (0.012) −0.022 [1.58]
Number of children <18 in hhld 4.104 (0.067) 3.897 (0.102) 0.207 [1.62]
Number of applicants in household 1.202 (0.016) 1.160 (0.020) 0.042 [1.44]
Single household head 0.083 (0.008) 0.083 (0.014) 0.000 [0.00]
Married household head 0.448 (0.015) 0.488 (0.025) −0.040 [1.37]
Household size 6.885 (0.087) 6.542 (0.120) 0.342 [2.10]**
Number of observations 1,136 399
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%; Standard errors are in parentheses, and t-statistics are in brackets.
Sample is households with children age 10–14 in which at least one adult has applied to Jefas. Data from Oct. 2002 EPH.
All estimates are weighted by household size. Bolded text is used to signify impact estimates for primary outcomes.
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to the economic crisis by sending children into the workforce and that Jefas mitigated
this behavior. Table 3 shows that the overall percentage of applicants’ children who re-
ported working tripled from 0.8% in 2001 (before the crisis) to 2.5% in 2002 (after the
crisis) but remained unchanged for the children of participants during that same time.
Likewise, school attendance fell for all children after the crisis but the change was more
than twice as large among the children of applicants. Unconditional difference-in-
differences estimates of Jefas’ impact on work and school attendance are reported in
Table 3 as 1.7 percentage points and 2.2 percentage points, respectively. The estimated
impact on work is statistically significant while the impact on school attendance is not.
Again, this is promising suggestive evidence that Jefas was effective at softening the ef-
fect of the crisis on vulnerable children. However, a more robust empirical strategy is
necessary to allay concerns that these results may be influenced by selection bias.5 Empirical methodology
For this analysis, I extend the methodological approach used by Galasso and Ravallion
(2004) to study the program’s impact on adult participants. Their strategy was to com-
pare program participants with a propensity-matched group of program applicants who
Table 3 Change from 2001–2002 for panel sample
Participants Applicants Difference
2001 2002 2001 2002 (part. - appl.)
Mean Mean Change T-stat Mean Mean Change T-stat Change T-stat
Outcomes of interest (2001)
Works 0.011 0.011 0 0 0.008 0.025 0.017 1.67 −0.017 1.96**
Attends school 0.985 0.969 −0.016 2.32 0.983 0.945 −0.037 2.95 0.022 1.51
Attributes of children (2001)
Male 0.514 0.514 0 0 0.500 0.500 0 0 0.000 0.00
Age 10.86 11.89 1.03 2.54 10.90 11.92 1.02 0.75 0.010 0.40
Attributes of the household (2001)
Lives in a shantytown 0.051 0.052 0.001 0.16 0.063 0.054 −0.008 0.68 0.009 0.61
Bathroom 0.885 0.898 0.013 0.93 0.908 0.862 −0.046 1.76 0.059 2.02**
Rooms per person 0.435 0.432 −0.003 0.41 0.501 0.479 −0.022 1.48 0.018 1.06
Number of children <18 in hhld 4.212 4.205 −0.007 0.19 3.996 3.866 −0.130 2.14 0.123 1.74*
Single household head 0.082 0.090 0.008 1.23 0.079 0.075 −0.004 0.37 0.012 0.39
Married household head 0.447 0.434 −0.013 1.84 0.487 0.474 −0.013 1.44 −0.001 0.06
Household size 7.093 7.132 0.039 0.81 6.766 6.707 −0.059 0.69 0.098 1.00
Number of observations 504 504 164 164
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. Note: test of age is a test of whether age increases by 1 year. Sample is households with children age 10–14 in which at least one adult who has applied to
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Jefas on children’s work and school attendance in households with children ages 10–14.
In this paper, I construct a counterfactual outcome for each participant household using
propensity scores. I estimate propensity scores at the household level to mirror the real-
world household-level selection process. Propensity scores are estimated parametrically by
fitting a probit model of participation (i.e., enrollment in Jefas) conditional on observed
child- and household-level characteristics. I selected covariates for the propensity-score
model based on their proximity to the program enrollment process; either because of their
association with poverty and need (which may have caused households to apply early in
the cycle) or because the attribute may be directly associated with preferential treatment
in admission decisions (e.g., male applicants may have received preference). I then use the
fitted model to predict a propensity score for each household.
Estimating program effects in this manner, outlined by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983),
is appealing in cases where (1) assignment to the treatment group can be made plaus-
ibly random conditional on observed covariates, and (2) there is sufficient overlap in
the conditional probabilities of treatment between the treatment and comparison
groups. I will argue that both conditions are met in this analysis.
Both the cross-sectional and panel samples are used for analysis, with propensity
scores estimated separately for each sample. For the panel sample, I construct propen-
sity scores using baseline covariates measured in 2001. For the much larger cross-
sectional sample, I use covariates measured in 2002 because baseline covariates are
missing for approximately half of the observations.
Using covariates measured at follow-up to construct propensity scores must be done
carefully to avoid matching on endogenous characteristics. The tradeoff is that the
much larger sample size allows for more precise impact estimates. For the cross-
sectional sample, I estimate the propensity score using a combination of immutable
characteristics (e.g. children’s gender) and characteristics that do not appear to change
between 2001 and 2002 based on analysis of changes in the longitudinal sample shown
in Table 3. I rule out as candidates any characteristic that may have been affected by
Jefas participation, based on either theoretical reasoning or empirical evidence. For ex-
ample, an examination of the empirical evidence in Table 3 shows that the number of
children in the household may have been affected by the Jefas program itself, as the
number of children per household decreased by less than half as much among partici-
pants as among applicants from 2001 to 2002. Therefore, I rule out this characteristic
as a candidate for calculating the propensity score.
The final list of characteristics used for estimating the propensity score is shown in
Table 4, along with coefficients from the fitted model for the cross-sectional sample. Coef-
ficient estimates in the panel sample are similar in magnitude. Although several covariates
are significant in this regression, the model has low explanatory power (R2 = 0.04), which
is consistent with the clear ex ante similarity of observable characteristics between appli-
cant and participant households.
Given the arguably arbitrary nature of program enrollment, it is also not surprising
that there is a large region of overlapping support, shown graphically in Figure 1 for
the cross-sectional sample. Of the 1,535 total observations in the cross-sectional sam-
ple, 6 observations (all in the treatment group) fall outside the region of common sup-
port. Of 668 observations in the panel sample, 23 observations are off support.









Applicant is female −0.38***
(0.11)
Applicant is household head 0.19**
(0.10)
Number of applicants in household 0.20**
(0.08)
Lives in a shantytown −0.07
(0.17)
Rooms per person −0.24
(0.16)
Household head is married −0.03
(0.09)








Number of observations 2306
Number treated off support 0
Pseudo R2 0.04
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. Notes: Sample is
children age 10–14 who have a parent who applied to Jefas. Data from Oct. 2002 EPH.
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cross-sectional sample or the panel sample meets the criteria outlined by Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983) and is an appropriate method of estimating the average treatment ef-
fect on the treated (ATT).
With propensity scores in hand, I estimate the counterfactual outcome for each treat-
ment household in the following manner. First, I take weighted averages over outcomes
for households in the applicant group, who are observationally similar to the partici-
pants in terms of their propensity scores. There are N participants indexed i = 1,…,
N and P applicants indexed j = 1,…,P. Let YKi be the outcome of interest for household
i in state K, where K = T for participants (the treated group) and K =C for applicants
Figure 1 Overlapping support in the distribution of the propensity score.
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Following Galasso and Ravallion (2004), I use local linear weights, which are con-
structed using all individuals in the control group and which have been found to per-
form well at the boundaries of the propensity score. Local linear weighting is
competitive with other estimators in terms of bias so long as there is good common
support (which is the case here), and achieves lower variance than many estimators be-
cause more information is used (Busso et al. 2009). Matching is implemented in Stata
using < psmatch2 > with a default bandwidth of 0.8 (Leuven and Sianesi 2003).
Impact estimates are calculated using the cross-sectional sample as the difference be-
tween the average treatment group outcome and the average propensity-matched com-
parison group outcome, weighting household-level observations by number of children.
Analysis in the panel sample proceeds in the same manner, except using a difference-
in-differences approach in which the change from 2001–2002 is first calculated for each
group. Impact estimates are then calculated as the difference between the change in
the treatment group and the change in the propensity-matched comparison group.
Standard errors are bootstrapped with 100 repetitions7.
6 Main findings
Before proceeding to estimate the impact of Jefas on child work and school attendance,
I use the methodology described in Section 5 to replicate the impacts presented in
Galasso and Ravallion (2004), Table Eight, p. 388. This exercise serves two purposes.
First, it provides reassurance that I have correctly implemented the methodology out-
lined above. Second, it demonstrates the degree to which impacts on adult outcomes
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and the smaller sample of participants with children between the ages of 10 and 14 that
is the focus of this paper.
Table 5 presents conditional means, matched cross-sectional estimates, and matched
difference-in-differences estimates for each sample. The first row for each sample in
Table 5 shows the estimates from Table Eight in Galasso and Ravallion (2004). The sec-
ond row replicates those estimates using the full sample of participant and applicant
households constructed for this paper. The third row shows estimates for the sample of
households with children ages 10–14.
In the full sample of 3,509 participant and applicant households, I find point esti-
mates and standard errors that are uniformly within 10% of (and frequently equivalent
to) the original magnitudes reported in Galasso and Ravallion (2004).
Among the smaller sample of 1,529 households with children ages 10–14, point esti-
mates are remarkably similar to those for the full sample. The most noticeable differ-
ence in impacts between the two samples is for household income. Although the
impact on individual income is similar across the two samples, the impact on total
household income is substantially smaller in the subset of households with children
ages 10–14. I will revisit this finding and suggest a potential interpretation after pre-


















438.3 172.9 0.86 0.04 0.10 20.6
Replication using
full sample
419.8 169.5 0.85 0.05 0.10 20.3
Households with
children age 10-14





81.19 (16.0) 89.2 (5.27) 0.49 (0.02) −0.26 (0.02) −0.23 (0.02) 9.2 (0.8)
Replication using
full sample
79.88 (17.1) 91.4 (6.00) 0.49 (0.02) −0.25 (0.02) −0.23 (0.02) 9.2 (0.6)
Households with
children age 10-14





103.41 (32.3) 113.6 (15.1) 0.46 (0.04) −0.23 (0.04) −0.23 (0.04) 8.9 (1.5)
Replication using
full sample
92.33 (28.8) 95.67 (10.7) 0.42 (0.04) −0.22 (0.04) −0.20 (0.04) 8.9 (2.0)
Households with
children age 10-14
67.08 (41.1) 101.1 (21.9) 0.41 (0.07) −0.25 (0.06) −0.16 (0.06) 7.3 (3.1)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, bootstrapped with 100 repetitions. Sample sizes are 3,509 for the full sample
and 1,529 for the sample of households with children ages 10–14. Source: Galasso and Ravallion (2004) and author’s
calculations from EPH. Incomes are reported in 2002 dollars.
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attendance using the 2002 cross-section are shown in Table 6. Propensity-matched dif-
ferences in the explanatory covariates are shown below the main impact estimates to
demonstrate that propensity matching was successful at providing balance.
The estimates in Table 6 indicate that a household’s participation in Jefas leads to a
0.6 percentage point decrease in the probability that a child works, from 1.3% to 0.7%.
Likewise, participation causes an increase in the probability of school attendance of 2.0
percentage points, from 94.8% to 96.8%8. The estimate for school attendance is signifi-
cant at a 90% confidence level, while the estimate for work is not significant9. There
are no significant differences in weighted means between the treatment and compari-
son groups on any other demographic characteristics or household attributes after
adjusting for the propensity score.
As noted earlier, one possible source of concern regarding the cross-sectional esti-
mates of program impact is that the observable household characteristics used to calcu-
late the propensity score were measured after the program had been implemented. As
a result, some or all of those characteristics may have been affected by program partici-
pation. To address this concern, Table 7 presents propensity-matched difference-in-
differences estimates for the panel sample. In this sample, propensity scores were
estimated using only pre-intervention baseline (2001) data. Table 7 shows the pre-to-
post intervention change in outcomes for the treatment group, the pre-to-post inter-
vention change in outcomes for the comparison group, and the difference between the
two groups. Because the panel sample is only 45% as large as the cross-sectional sam-
ple, standard errors are larger in this analysis.
The impact estimates for work and school attendance in Table 7 are both within 0.2
percentage points of the estimates in Table 5. The propensity-matched difference-in






Mean Mean Diff t-stat
Works 0.007 0.013 −0.006 1.11
Attends school 0.968 0.948 0.020 1.76**
Male child 0.511 0.521 −0.012 0.40
Child's age 11.892 11.854 0.015 0.35
Applicant's age 37.111 37.833 −0.722 0.82
Applicant is female 0.316 0.306 0.010 0.05
Applicant is household head 0.478 0.500 −0.022 0.68
Number of applicants in household 1.189 1.190 −0.001 0.22
Lives in a shantytown 0.059 0.061 −0.002 0.30
Rooms per person 0.437 0.458 −0.021 0.46
Household head is married 0.449 0.448 0.002 0.92
Household head is single 0.083 0.103 −0.008 0.39
Number of observations 1,130 399
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. Notes: Sample is households with children age 10–14, in
which at least one adult has applied to Jefas. Data from Oct. 2002 EPH. Estimates are weighted by household size.
Table 7 Propensity-matched difference-in-differences estimate of the average impact of





2001-2002 2001-2002 D-D T-stat
Change Change Estimate
Works 0.001 0.009 −0.008 1.16
Attends school −0.017 −0.035 0.018 0.91
Male child 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00
Child’s age 1.024 1.048 −0.024 0.50
Lives in a shantytown −0.003 0.003 −0.006 0.30
Bathroom 0.008 −0.035 0.043 1.59
Rooms per person 0.435 0.439 −0.004 −0.23
Number of children <18 in hhld 4.212 4.042 0.170 0.91
Household head is single 0.074 0.070 0.004 0.25
Household head is married 0.471 0.484 −0.013 −0.29
Household size 7.093 6.820 0.273 1.12
Number of observations 481 164
Notes: Sample is households with children age 10–14, in which at least one parent has applied to Jefas. Data from EPH.
Estimates are weighted by household size. Bolded text is used to signify impact estimates for primary outcomes.
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mated effect on work is no longer statistically significant in this smaller sample. Once
again, conditional on weighting there is no evidence of substantively or statistically sig-
nificant imbalance in demographic characteristics between the treatment and compari-
son groups.
Recall from Table 5 that participants with children ages 10–14 experience a smaller
gain in household income than other participants, even though the impact on the par-
ticipant’s own income is equally large. The results in Tables 6 and 7 seem consistent
with this finding, for two reasons. First, cessation of child work for pay will mechanic-
ally decrease the net impact of Jefas income on total household income. This effect
would not be observed in households with only very young children or children old
enough to have committed to the workforce. Second, the estimated increase in a child’s
school attendance might come at the expense of domestic production (e.g. caring for
younger children). Because Jefas work hours are inflexible, other adult members of the
household who have more flexibility might curtail their work effort outside the home
so as to compensate for the affected child’s reduced domestic production. This effect
also would not be observed in households with children who already attend school
regularly (i.e. children younger than 10) or children do not attend at all (e.g. children
older than 14 who have committed to the workforce). Both mechanisms imply that the
impact should be smaller in households that have children ages 10–14 than for other
households, which we observe to be the case.
Finally, to put the results in Tables 6 and 7 in context, note that there were around 2
million Jefas participants in October 2002. Each participant had on average 0.9 children
between ages 10–14, for a total of about 1,792,800 children in this age group. Taken at
face value, the average point estimates in Tables 6 and 7 suggest that as a result of the
program 12,550 fewer children worked and 34,063 more children attended school than
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or $333 million, the cost of averting work is approximately $30,956 per child and the
cost per additional child in school is approximately $9,287. Given that the base rate of
child work is likely to be underreported in the EPH, these figures are likely to under-
state the number of affected children and overstate the pecuniary cost of averting work
for pay.
7 Additional analyses
This section presents estimates from parametric and doubly-robust impact estimators.
The parametric estimates provide evidence on variation in the impact by subgroup, as
well as confirm the earlier results under a different set of assumptions. Doubly-robust
estimates provide additional reassurance that the earlier results are not sensitive to the
estimation strategy.
To determine whether the impact varies by characteristics such as by age or gender, I
turn to a parametric specification. Whereas the semiparametric techniques employed
in the previous section require that assignment into the treatment group be random
conditional on observable characteristics, traditional parametric estimation of treat-
ment effects requires assumptions about the full relationship between the observed
characteristics and outcomes of interest. If such assumptions can be reasonably made,
then parametric regression models with treatment*covariate interactions can yield add-
itional insight into treatment effect heterogeneity; i.e. “what works best for whom.”
I examine variation using a simple linear model. The model includes interactions be-
tween the treatment and explanatory characteristics that could affect the treatment, in
particular the age of the child, the gender of the child, and the gender of the parent
who applied to Jefas. I construct an estimate of the overall ATT for comparison with
earlier estimates using predictions from the fitted model. First, I predict the probability
of the outcome variable for each treated observation with the treatment set to 1. Next,
I predict the outcome with the treatment dummy set to zero. The difference is the esti-
mate of ATT. To illustrate, let xi1 … xiK be a vector of covariates and interaction terms,
and let T represent a dummy variable equal to 1 for program participants. After fitting
the model to estimate β^0 … β^K , β^T on the whole sample, ATT would be estimated





β^0 þ β^1xi1 þ…þ β^KxiK þ β^T
 
− β^0 þ β^1xi1 þ … þ β^KxiK
 h i
Coefficients and standard errors from a linear regression including interactions oftreatment with child’s gender, child’s age, and the gender of the parent who applied to
the Jefas program are shown in Table 8 for each of the two outcomes10.
The treatment and treatment*interaction coefficients are not jointly significant at
p < 0.10 in either of these regressions. Using the fitted linear model to calculate ATT,
participation in Jefas is estimated to cause a 1.2 percentage point reduction in the prob-
ability that a child reports working and a 1.7 percentage point reduction in the likeli-
hood of skipping school. The estimated impact on school attendance is similar in
magnitude to the estimates in Tables 6 and 7, while the estimated impact on child work
is larger.
Table 8 Linear regressions for work and school attendance
Works Attends school
Jefas participant −0.001 0.129
(0.056) (0.079)
Treatment*male applicant 0.022* 0.005
(0.013) (0.021)
Treatment*female child 0.017 −0.032
(0.015) (0.020)
Treatment*child age 0.002 −0.008
(0.006) (0.007)
Child is female −0.023* 0.047**
(0.014) (0.018)
Child's age 0.009* −0.015**
(0.005) (0.006)
Applicant's age 0.000 −0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
Applicant is male −0.030** 0.004
(0.015) (0.020)
Applicant is household head 0.011* −0.005
(0.008) (0.011)
Number of applicants in household 0.021** −0.001
(0.019) (0.010)
Lives in a shantytown 0.006 −0.007
(0.012) (0.019)
Rooms per person −0.027** 0.080***
(0.010) (0.020)
Household head is married −0.006 0.022**
(0.006) (0.010)





Number of observations 1535 1535
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. Standard errors are in brackets, and are robust to clustering at the
household level. Note: Sample is children age 10–14, who have a parent who has applied to Jefas. Data from Oct. 2002 EPH.
Both regressions include region dummies. Bolded text is used to signify impact estimates for primary outcomes.
Juras IZA Journal of Labor & Development Page 16 of 202014, 3:14
http://www.izajold.com/content/3/1/14The estimated impact of Jefas on child work varies significantly by gender of the ap-
plicant—so much so that the average treatment effect is driven entirely by the children
of female applicants. None of the other interaction terms are significant in this regres-
sion, but the sign on the coefficients suggests that male children benefit more from the
program than female children and that younger children benefit more than older chil-
dren; the latter is what would be expected if there is more of a social stigma to sending
younger children into the labor force.
None of the interaction terms are significant in the regression for school attendance.
However, the signs again suggest that younger children benefit more from the program
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children than for children who are approaching working age. The school-attendance re-
gression also suggests that the impact of participation on schooling is larger for male
children and possibly for the children of male applicants.
Finally, I calculate doubly-robust estimates of the program’s impact on work and
school attendance. This exercise serves as an additional test of the robustness of the
parametric and non-parametric results. Doubly-robust estimation combines propensity-
score weighting with regression modeling of the relationship between covariates and
the outcome for the treatment and control groups separately (Imbens and Wooldridge
2009). These estimates will be unbiased if either the propensity-score model or the out-
come regression model is correctly specified. If both are correctly specified, the doubly-
robust estimates will also have smaller variances than the semiparametric estimates.
To calculate doubly-robust estimates, I follow the procedure outlined on page 339 of
Emsley et al. (2008). Standard errors are bootstrapped with 100 replications. There is
no currently-accepted method of incorporating sampling weights into the doubly-
robust estimation procedure. Therefore, to produce child-level estimates that are com-
parable with those above, I use a child-level dataset produced by disaggregating the
cross-sectional household-level dataset. The disaggregated dataset includes a sample of
2,306 child-level observations (clustered in 1,529 households).
Doubly-robust estimates are presented in Table 9 for each of the two outcomes.
The doubly-robust estimates are similar to the main semiparametric estimates re-
ported in Tables 6 and 7 and the parametric estimates calculated from Table 8. The es-
timated impact on child work of 1.0 percentage points is slightly larger than the
semiparametric estimates. The estimated 1.8 percentage-point impact on school attend-
ance is equivalent to the difference-in-difference estimate. The similarity of impact esti-
mates produced by semiparametric, parametric, and doubly-robust estimation strategies
lends confidence to the main results.Table 9 Doubly-robust child-level estimates
Impact estimate T-stat
Works −0.010 1.88*
Attends school 0.018 1.73*
Male child −0.009 0.37
Child's age −0.011 0.15
Applicant's age −0.009 0.02
Applicant is male −0.005 0.29
Applicant is household head 0.001 0.05
Number of applicants in household 0.000 0.01
Lives in a shantytown −0.004 0.31
Rooms per person 0.001 0.06
Household head is married −0.012 0.55
Household head is single −0.004 0.33
Number of observations
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%.
Notes: Sample is children age 10–14; data from 2002 EPH. Estimates for independent variables are calculated using a
doubly-robust model in which the variable of interest is used to calculate the propensity score only. Bolded text is used
to signify impact estimates for primary outcomes.
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This study presents evidence that parents’ participation in the Jefas public employment pro-
gram helped alleviate child labor and increase school attendance for children age 10–14 in
Argentina. Impact estimates are found by comparing participants with a propensity-matched
group of program applicants not receiving benefits. Estimates using cross-sectional data from
2002 indicate that participation reduced the reported incidence of child work by 46% (0.6 per-
centage points), and decreased absenteeism by 38% (2.0 percentage points). Difference-in-
differences estimates using the smaller panel sample confirm these results, suggesting program
effects of 0.8 percentage points on child work and 1.8 percentage points on school attendance.
These results are consistent with the observation that participants who have children
ages 10–14 experience a smaller gain in household income than other participants,
even though the impact on the participant’s own income is equally large. The smaller
net gain for such households may be due in part to reduced income from child work.
Adults may also adjust their labor supply to compensate for lost home production of
children who are newly attending school.
Parametric estimates of ATT suggest that the children of female participants benefit
significantly more from the program than the children of male participants. Although
not statistically significant, these estimates also suggest that younger children benefit
more from the program than older children in terms of school attendance. This would
be expected if families value education more for younger children than for children
who are approaching working age. Similarly, the parametric estimates suggest that boys
benefit more from the program than girls and that younger children benefit more than
older children; the latter is what would be expected if there is more of a social stigma
to sending younger children into the labor force.
The similarity of estimates derived using parametric, semiparametric, and doubly-
robust estimation techniques alleviates concerns about the validity of underlying as-
sumptions. Results from the panel sample alleviate concerns that the cross-sectional
impact estimates could be due to selection bias in the form of pre-existing differences
between the treatment and control groups.
Back of the envelope calculations show that the Jefas program likely caused a reduc-
tion in the number of children working in Argentina of around 12,550 and an increase
in the number attending school of around 34,063. These estimates are likely to under-
state the number of affected children due to underreporting of child labor in the EPH.Endnotes
1The World Bank calculated the expected hourly wage rate (averaging formal and in-
formal work) in the first income decile as AR$0.97 and in the second decile as AR
$2.01. This corresponds to monthly incomes of AR$180 and AR$370, respectively.
2It is unclear exactly what applicants were told regarding their possibilities for future
participation. The September cutoff was “unofficial” and appears not to have been
strictly enforced. A small amount of additional enrollment occurred after September
2002, most notably right before the presidential elections.
3Note that The EPH has a strong commitment to anonymity, which means that par-
ticipants could report adverse information—e.g. information that would disqualify them
from the program—without fear of reprisal.
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to year; this is not feasible using EPH data, as race variables are not similar to those
used in the CPS. Note that this process results in the exclusion of individual child-level
observations. If gender and/or age do not match for any children in a household, the
household is dropped from the sample entirely regardless of adult-level matches.
5A test of joint significance of all 11 variables finds significant evidence of imbalance
(p = 0.07); a test of the 10 variables excluding rooms per person finds no evidence of
imbalance (p = 0.73).
6The most likely reason for differential under-reporting to occur would be if, despite
the survey’s guarantee of anonymity, children of participants or their parents (they an-
swered the survey together) were less likely to report child work for fear of being
dropped from the program.
7Although Abadie and Imbens (2008) show that bootstrapping may be inappropriate
for one-to-one matching, as far as I am aware there is no comparable evidence to sug-
gest it would be inappropriate for weighting.
8Note that the propensity-matched estimate of child work in the treatment group of
0.6 percent differs from the estimate of 0.9 percent shown in Table 2. The estimates are
different because a disproportionate number of treatment-group households that were
dropped for lack of common support had children who were reported as working.
9As it turns out, the results are not particularly sensitive to the choice of weights. For
example, using kernel rather than local linear weights produces point estimates of the
impact of 1.0 percentage points for working, and 2.3 percentage points for school at-
tendance, with a similar level of precision.
10These standard errors are robust to clustering at the household level. Accounting
for clustering has little effect on the standard errors in the linear model.
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